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BARBARA A. SCHAPIRO

Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Evil:
Debating Othello in the Classroom
Since “evil” has become a term much in vogue in our
current political climate, it seems ever more important to
explore its psychic meanings and origins. What, first of all, do
analysts and therapists mean by the word “evil”? The grandiosity of the term, as well as its traditionally religious connotations, perhaps make it unsuited to the therapeutic context. As
Ruth Stein (2002) has commented, “’Evil’ may sound too
allegorical or too concrete, too essentialist or too objective for
psychoanalytic ways of thinking that are oriented towards the
study of individual subjectivity” (394). In an article entitled
“Evil in the Mind of the Therapist” (2001), Robert Winer
surveyed a number of practitioners and found a general
consensus that “an evil person is someone who knowingly
deeply hurts innocent people” (613). The emphasis here, he
says, is on the “knowingly”—conscious deliberateness is key—
as it is on the extremity of the hurt inflicted: “negating the
other person’s soul, . . . destruction as an end in itself” (613).
Winer discusses how his own psychological engagement with a
patient works against his ever seeing that patient as evil, “no
matter how outrageous his crimes” (614). The social psychologist Roy Baumeister (1997) has observed that even serial killers
never see themselves as evil but “regard themselves as victims”
(47). Winer suggests that it is easier to experience characters
in books and movies as evil because we know them only
through their evil actions. Even so, he concludes, “Our inability to identify with a character we understand to be evil seems
connected for me to our inability to acknowledge our own
destructiveness” (621).
This paper was presented at a panel, “The Classroom as Psychoanalytic Space,”
at the October 2002 conference of the International Federation for Psychoanalytic
Education, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
American Imago, Vol. 60, No. 4, 481–499. © 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Debating Othello in the Classroom

Othello (1604) is a text that forces us to consider the
nature and problem of evil, as well as the difficulty of acknowledging our own destructiveness. The play is also enjoying a sort
of renascence in our present time, as several recent film and
television adaptations attest.1 The vexed questions that Othello
raises, I believe, are particularly timely: How do we understand
Iago, for instance, as a representation of evil? Is he a figure of
irrational destructiveness for whom we can find no motivation,
no understanding based on reason or cause? Does he suggest
an instinctual basis of evil, a destructiveness intrinsic to the
human psyche, as Freud or Melanie Klein would have it? Or
should he be interpreted as inextricable from Othello and his
anxieties about his race and Desdemona’s love for him? Can
Iago be interpreted as a projection of Othello’s enraged but
disavowed destructiveness, a destructiveness that is in fact
rooted in the terrors of humiliation and disintegration that
narcissistic injury and erotic dependency can arouse? This
paper will consider these questions, along with various responses of students in my classroom, as they speak to current
debates in the play, in psychoanalysis, and in our culture.
Critics have long pondered the issue of why Shakespeare
deliberately stripped the Iago character of clear motives when
he reconceived Giraldi Cinthio’s original story from the
Hecatommithi, a collection of tales printed in Italy in the
sixteenth century. In Cinthio’s story, the Iago figure, known as
the Ensign, is himself passionately in love with Desdemona. He
is also convinced that Desdemona is secretly in love with the
Captain (Cassio), and thus the Ensign’s wicked machinations
are spurred by genuine sexual jealousy. Shakespeare removes
this motive, mentions Othello’s promotion of Cassio over Iago,
and leaves only a few vague, passing references to possible
sexual jealousy. Iago alludes twice to his suspicions that both
Othello and Cassio may have slept with his wife: “I do suspect
the lusty Moor / Hath leaped into my seat” (2.1.295–6); and
only parenthetically, “(For I fear Cassio with my nightcap too)”
(2.1.307). When Iago first refers to the rumor about Othello
and his wife, however, he adds oddly, “I know not if it be true,
/ But I, for mere suspicion in that kind, / Will do, as if for
surety” (1.3.379–381)—lines that remind us of Coleridge’s
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(1814) famous alliterative description of the “motive-hunting
of motiveless Malignity” (315).
In a recent talk entitled “Psychoanalysis after September
11” (2002), Jonathan Lear referred to Iago as a representation
of such motiveless malignity in unconscious life. Iago embodies, Lear argued, a hatred that cannot be rationalized, an evil
not based on reasons. Lear drew a distinction between jealousy
and envy; while the jealous Othello attacks because he believes
he has lost the good object or been betrayed by it, the envy that
Iago represents “attacks the good because it is good.” Lear
shares the Kleinian view of an innate, instinctual destructiveness. This perspective indeed offers one possible interpretation of Iago. The text also allows, however, for an alternative
reading that I would like to pursue. I wonder as well about the
social implications of construing destructiveness or evil as
acausal and uncontingent. I am especially wary because my
students of late seem to be increasingly comfortable with such
a view as they voice current cultural attitudes. I happened to be
teaching Othello in the fall of 2001, a few weeks after September
11th. I noticed a real difference from previous years in the class
discussion of “motiveless malignity”: students embraced it far
more readily and unquestioningly. Many expressed the view
that Iago represented the reality of evil, an evil all the more
powerful and terrifying because it was not based on reasons
and could not be understood. The student who spoke most
eloquently on this matter was also the one who had taken the
most aggressive, militaristic stance in an earlier discussion on
terrorism and the war in Afghanistan.
This past fall, when I taught the play again, I asked my
students to respond in writing to the issue of motiveless
malignity. More than twice as many students as not wrote that
they believed in such a phenomenon. “I do believe in motiveless malignity,” one stated. “All you have to do is watch the 6
o’clock news every night. Society is full of people who do evil
things just because the opportunity is there.” Several referred
to 9/11 and the terrorists. A female student declared, “Yes, I
believe in such a thing. Just check the hallways in any middle
school or high school.” Another student wrote about coming
out of a Wendy’s restaurant to find “a punky guy” sitting in the

484

Debating Othello in the Classroom

car parked next to hers, “just spitting over and over into my
car. Where was the motivation in that? I didn’t do anything to
initiate such a mean and nasty thing for him to do to my car.”
A number of responses referred to Iago and evildoers in
general as simply being “crazy.” Some of the more thoughtful
responses, however, expressed doubts. One student wrote that
although we may not see it explicitly expressed in the play,
Iago’s malignity had to arise, he believed, “out of feelings of
inferiority.” Another asserted, “Just because we cannot see the
motive does not mean a motive does not exist.” And finally,
one wrote, “We, as humans, are all complex, unique, and
sometimes imbalanced individuals. ‘Motiveless malignity’ is
incorrect, in my estimation. To me, some people operate
under their own set of rules which the rest of us just can’t
understand.”
Psychoanalysis can support a view of Iago’s evil as deeply
contingent and bound up in a relational history and narrative,
a narrative that can indeed provide a motivational base. This
view also draws on Klein, though on the concept of splitting
rather than the death instinct. The fact is that Iago would have
no power over Othello were Othello not in love; Iago’s
destructiveness can best be understood, I believe, within the
context of Othello’s love. Perhaps the play enacts not the
psychic reality of destructiveness as an innate, irrational force,
but the psychic reality of splitting. As Klein and Fairbairn have
theorized, in the immature psyche, enraged, bad, destructive
feelings are split off and projected in order to protect the self
and its good, loved object—a primitive defense that can always
be remobilized. The very purity of Desdemona’s goodness and
the absoluteness of Iago’s evil support a view of the play as a
dramatization of splitting. It is possible to understand Iago, in
psychic terms, as representing a split-off, repudiated destructiveness within Othello himself.
The interpretation of Iago as a symbolic manifestation of
a spirit within Othello in fact has a long critical history. F. R.
Leavis (1937), for instance, claimed that Iago “represents
something that is in Othello—in Othello the husband of
Desdemona: the essential traitor is within the gates” (141).
The Jungian critic Maud Bodkin (1934) also considered Iago
to be the “shadow-side of Othello” (245). More recently,
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Arthur Kirsch (1981) writes that Iago “is a projection of at least
a part of Othello’s own psyche” (28), and Janet Adelman
(1992) too views Iago as the “psychic repository for Othello’s
own unrecognized doubts” (269). In an interesting oedipal
reading of the play, Edward Snow (1980) interprets Iago “not
as the dark, impulsive id but the punitive, sex-hating superego”
(409). Most persuasive is Snow’s point about the entire play’s
“texture of disavowal” (385) and the pervasiveness of repression throughout the text. Richard Wheeler (1985) similarly
discusses the “excluded violence” and “unintegrated disruptive
tendencies” (205) that characterize this play. He suggests that
“in making Iago into a scapegoat for Othello’s guilt,
[Shakespeare] is still partly in need of a detachable villain to
blur the clarity of the tragic impossibility of joining Othello’s
heroic manhood with Desdemona’s sexual and nurturant
womanhood” (205).
What is significant about such perspectives in our consideration of the psychoanalysis of evil is that they allow us to
conceive of Iago’s destructiveness as responsive rather than as
purely instinctual. Iago’s destructiveness is inseparable from
Othello’s destructiveness, and that destructiveness is a response to the intolerable vulnerability and self-endangerment
that Othello’s love for Desdemona, and his status as a black
man in relation to a white aristocratic woman, involves. As
Stephen Mitchell (1993) has argued, aggression need not be
understood as an instinct or drive, but as a “pre-wired potential
that is evoked by circumstances perceived subjectively as threatening or endangering” (161). Among many contemporary
Kleinians, Mitchell explains, “envy and aggression are
recontextualized as reactions to and flights from dependency
and its attendant anxieties. It is the desperate effort to ward off
depressive anxiety consequent to the dependent object relation that is regarded as the well-spring of destructiveness”
(1997, 127). The relational theorist Sue Grand expands on this
view in her study, The Reproduction of Evil (2000). She explicitly
links evil with trauma and what she calls “catastrophic loneliness.” Trauma, she believes, “induces death anxiety; this death
anxiety is metabolized and redissociated through pathological,
narcissistic modalities” (69). The traumatized personality, she
argues, is “perennially rooted in narcissistic terrors and narcis-

486

Debating Othello in the Classroom

sistic forms of defense” (69), of which splitting is among the
most prominent.
Harold Bloom (1998) offers an intriguing interpretation
of Iago that indeed posits traumatic narcissistic injury at the
root of Iago’s destructive nature. Bloom compares Iago to
Satan, with Othello in the role of God: “Othello was everything
to Iago, because war was everything; passed over, Iago is
nothing, and in warring against Othello, his war is against
ontology” (435). Bloom discusses Iago’s “sickening loss of
being” as a result of Othello’s passing him over for promotion
(the motive the text emphasizes most, though most critics find
it insufficient). “The ontological shock of that rejection,”
Bloom continues, “is Shakespeare’s original invention and is
the trauma that truly creates Iago, no mere wicked Ensign but
rather a genius of evil who has engendered himself from a
great Fall” (436). Although Bloom eschews psychoanalytic
language, his reading can nevertheless be understood in
psychoanalytic terms. Bloom’s Iago is the traumatized figure
facing the “ontological devastation” or, in Grand’s words, the
“catastrophic loneliness” pursuant to an overwhelming narcissistic blow.
Christopher Bollas (1995) has discussed Milton’s Satan in
quite similar terms. Bollas sees Satan as “having experienced
not simply a loss of a paradisal place but a catastrophic
annihilation of his position. Ruptured from the folds of
nurturance, the Satanic subject bears a deep wound and good
is presented now as an enviously delivered offering” (184). In
the figure of Satan, Bollas claims, Milton reveals “the nature
and effect of trauma” by “illuminating how loss of love and
catastrophic displacement can foster an envious hatred of life
mutating into an identification with the anti-life” (184). This
interpretation parallels Grand’s discussion of Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein and her view of the monster as “filled with the
desolation and grief that Frankenstein has disavowed in himself” (137). Shelley’s novel, Grand argues, “is an elucidation of
love repudiated becoming hatred; of the humiliation that
transmutes tenderness into vengeance” (135).
This conception of narcissistic trauma as the structural
origin of evil in fact governs Tim Blake Nelson’s 2001 film
adaptation of Othello, entitled O. The film is set in a contempo-
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rary private high school, and the Iago character (Hugo) is
more at the psychic center of the drama here than Othello
(O). In this version of the story, Iago/Hugo is given a dominating, high-powered father, the school’s basketball coach, who
ignores his son and has transferred all his paternal affection to
O as the team star. The movie presents several scenes that
effectively portray Hugo’s bitter sense of emotional abandonment in relation to his father, as well as his feelings of isolation
and humiliation. The film gives explicit representation to
psychological dynamics that perhaps implicitly inform the
original Shakespeare text.
Bollas’s argument about the traumatic structure of evil
also suggests a way to understand Shakespeare’s deliberate
stripping away of motives and the lack of personal complexity
in the characterization of Iago. In a discussion of the serial
killer, Bollas describes him as “someone who has been allegorized: he is squeezed into an identification with one quality,
evil, that obliterates other psychic qualities. . . . He identifies
with the force of trauma and out of this fate develops a
separate sense of the work of trauma, which, like Lucifer, he
turns into his profession: squeezing others into his frame of
reference” (218–19). Iago’s allegorical status, in other words,
can be interpreted as representing a distillation of the force of
trauma in which other psychic qualities have been obliterated.
We can all still recognize the Iago within ourselves not because
he is a part of our instinctual nature but because, as Bollas
argues, “we all have experienced shocking betrayals in an
otherwise trustworthy parental environment” and because “we
all have transformations to the allegorical plane when we
identify with the force of a feeling—in the case of evil, the
force of emptiness sponsored in our selves by the shock and its
unconscious marriage with the destructive sides of our personalities” (220).
Othello as a whole, I believe, is about narcissistic trauma or
self-endangerment in the context of dependency, a pattern
enacted on several levels. The play demonstrates, moreover,
the defensive destructiveness and splitting that result from
such trauma. Women are inextricable from this context of
dependency, as the original dependency is maternal. Othello’s
narcissistic anxieties—his fears of “ontological devastation”—
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are bound up with fantasies of female betrayal and rejection.
Feminist critics have indeed alerted us to the frequency in
Shakespeare’s plays of humiliation and breakdown fantasies in
relation to women and female sexuality. Madelon Sprengnether,
for instance, has argued persuasively that the general structure
of male dominance and violence against women throughout
Shakespeare’s plays “may be seen to obscure deeper patterns
of conflict in which women as lovers, and perhaps more
important as mothers, are perceived as radically untrustworthy” (1980, 161). In Shakespeare’s world, a man betrayed by a
woman represents the greatest humiliation, for it places him in
a position of weakness, a “feminine” posture. “To recover his
honor,” Sprengenther observes, “he must destroy the man or
woman who is responsible for his humiliation, for placing him
in a position of vulnerability” (154). Valerie Traub (1992) has
also recognized an essential paranoia in the representation of
female bodies and masculine desire in Shakespeare’s plays.
The idealization of women cloaks an underlying mistrust.
“Othello’s belief in woman’s power of deception,” she states,
“lies just under the surface of his idolization” (33). The
demonic Iago, in other words, is inseparable from the angelic
Desdemona, and both are part of a single story about selfendangerment in relation to women.
Adelman (1992) suggests a socio-historical context for
understanding the distrust of women, the fantasies of a contaminating femaleness, and the fears of maternal abandonment that so infuse Shakespeare’s plays. She considers the
custom of wet-nursing prevalent during Shakespeare’s time:
“Wet-nursing merely gave the child two psychic sites of intense
maternal deprivation rather than one: first, the original maternal rejection signaled by wet-nursing itself; and then the
weaning—routinely by the application of wormwood or another bitter-tasting substance to the nipple—and abrupt separation from the nurse-mother he or she might have known for
two or three years” (5). Othello’s relationship with Desdemona,
Adelman contends, is steeped in anxieties around maternal
dependency. She points out how Othello initially responds to
Desdemona precisely for her “maternal pity” (64)—“She lov’d
me for the dangers I had pass’d, / And I lov’d her that she did
pity them” (1.3.167–68). By becoming susceptible to
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Desdemona’s pity, Adelman argues, “Othello unmakes the
basis for his martial identity, exchanging it for one dependent
on her,” and this dependency “reawakens the sense of vulnerability that Othello had managed to conceal from himself
through his identity as a soldier” (65).
From the beginning of the play, Othello’s language—the
metaphors of turbulent seas and storms—when referring to
the intensity of his love for Desdemona betrays potential threat
and a danger of disastrous boundary loss: “For know, Iago, /
But that I love the gentle Desdemona, / I would not my
unhoused free condition / Put into circumscription and
confine / for the seas’ worth” (1.2.23–27). When reuniting
with her in Cyprus, he can barely contain himself: “O my soul’s
joy! / If after every tempest come such calms, / May the winds
blow till they have wakened death. / And let the laboring bark
climb hills of seas / Olympus-high, and duck again as low / As
hell’s from heaven” (2.1.182–87). And of course, the famous
lines, “And when I love thee not, / Chaos is come again”
(3.3.91–2), suggest an engulfing disintegration deeply linked
for Othello with love and its potential loss. Several critics have
interpreted the frequent associations of death with Othello’s
expressions of passion for Desdemona as connected to the
regressive fusion fantasies of primary narcissism.2
Othello’s anxieties in relation to women are also bound
up with the issue of race: the Moor’s outsider status as a black
man in a white, Christian society is crucial to appreciating the
extremity of his narcissistic vulnerability. As Stephen Greenblatt
(1980) asserts, Othello’s “blackness—the sign of all that the
society finds frightening and dangerous—is the indelible witness to Othello’s permanent status as an outsider, no matter
how highly the state may value his services or how sincerely he
has embraced its values” (240). Marianne Novy (1984) has
argued that “Othello’s desire for a love that is total fusion is, in
part, his attempt to escape from his underlying sense of
separateness” (133). In addition, the text reveals how Othello
internalizes the cultural associations of blackness with dirt,
pollution, and sexuality, and that dynamic contributes to a selfcontempt that is defended against by the idealization of
Desdemona. As Snow explains, Desdemona’s chastity “is significant to Othello only as a mirror for his own idealized self-
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image. . . . The possibility of Desdemona’s infidelity causes him
to see himself (as if for the first time) as black, and to regard
that blackness as a measure of sexual corruption as well as
social disgrace” (401). Snow points to Othello’s lines, “Her
name, that was as fresh / As Dian’s visage, is now begrimed and
black / As mine own face” (3.3.443–44), as evidence.
Novy (1984) has discussed how the racial stereotype of the
Moor overlaps with the gender stereotype of the woman in the
play: “conventional Renaissance European views would see
both as excessively passionate” (130). Cassio’s prostitute Bianca,
as Joyce Green MacDonald (2000) has argued, is “racialized as
black, assigned a set of negative sexual characteristics associated with Africa and Africans” (196). Cassio calls her a “monkey” and a “fitchew,” both of which, MacDonald points out, are
animals associated with strong sex drives. Bianca, she explains,
“is racialized as black because of her sexual activity outside of
patriarchal controls over the disposition of her body” (197).
MacDonald also notes the tradition of casting the role of
Bianca with a black actress in stage productions of the play. In
Othello, the racial anxieties and the sexual anxieties reinforce
each other.
A number of critics have stressed the importance of
Othello’s race while also arguing for his character’s psychological universality. Adelman states, “Shakespeare does not ‘other’
the psychological processes explored in the play by making
them only the consequences of Othello’s race; instead, he uses
Othello’s blackness to bring particular poignance and intensity
to dilemmas commonly shared” (275). While I agree with that
statement, some critics generalize Othello’s severely split condition to a degree I find unconvincing. The Freudian Snow, for
instance, sees the superego as a universal alienating force in
the human psyche, and thus he claims that “Othello’s
Moorishness merely forces him to live out with psychotic
intensity the metaphors of self-contempt that every civilized
white man can be brought to experience in his sexual relations
with a woman” (400). Does every man really harbor selfcontempt in his sexual relations with a woman?
From a different perspective, Lacanian critics also universalize splitting in their view of subjectivity as always threatened
and disrupted by the alien other within. In a thoughtful article
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on racism and “the other,” Stephen Frosh (2002) argues that
the Kleinian view of otherness—the projection of unwanted
aspects of the self onto the denigrated other—is too limited.
Following Laplanche and Lacan, he stresses “the essential
alienness of human subjectivity” (395) and the way in which
the unconscious itself functions as an “internal other” that
“radically disturbs the rather homely sense that each of us is
‘master’ of himself or herself, and in doing so it opens the way
to a collapse of confidence in the self, to a sense that however
robust it might seem, it has already been infiltrated by something subjectively inexplicable, something that the ‘self’ is not”
(394). This perspective, I believe, can indeed help us to
understand Othello’s unstable, divided condition—the way in
which, as Greenblatt has argued, Othello’s identity has been
infiltrated by the norms of white Christian culture—but I do
not see it as normative in general. Why is the other always and
necessarily such a threatening presence to or in the self?
Winnicott (1969), in his discussion of “object use,” for instance, has shown how recognition of otherness can be a
liberating, even joyous discovery. The internalized other can
also serve a soothing, comforting function within the self.
Threat and anxiety are certainly inherent to the condition of
infantile dependency on the other, but the specific nature of
that first dependent relationship (usually with a woman), the
social and cultural stresses on it, along with the infant’s genetic
temperament and tolerance for frustration, all determine the
degree of narcissistic anxieties that will develop. Othello dramatizes the effects of traumatic narcissistic injury—extreme anxieties in relation to mother/woman and a radical, defensive
splitting.
Othello’s sexual anxieties and narcissistic vulnerability are
also involved in one of the more interesting critical debates
about the play—the question of whether Othello and
Desdemona ever actually consummate their marriage, and
accordingly, whether sexual consummation would render
Othello’s character more or less emotionally vulnerable. The
dispute arises out of the following textual elements: at the end
of Act 1, Othello says that he has “but an hour / Of love” to
spend with Desdemona before he must depart for the Turkish
wars; then reunited with her in Cyprus, he states, “The
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purchase made, the fruits are to ensue, / That profit’s yet to
come ‘tween me and you” (2.3.9–10); and finally, he is aroused
from the connubial bedroom soon after by the drunken brawl
between Roderigo and Cassio. Bloom believes that the marriage is never consummated and that “Othello literally does
not know whether his wife is a virgin, and is afraid to find out,
one way or the other” (457). In addition, Bloom contends,
“Iago’s first insinuations of Desdemona’s supposed relationship with Cassio would have no effect if Othello knew her to
have been a virgin. It is because he does not know that Othello
is so vulnerable” (459).
Adelman, on the other hand, points out that “if Iago has
had time to get three lads of Cyprus drunk before he begins on
Cassio, then the lovers have had time for their intimacies”
(272). Moreover, she notes that “consummation is followed by
revulsion in three of the plays written in close proximity to
Othello—Troilus, All’s Well, and Measure” (272), and that “since
Shakespeare revises Cinthio’s more plausible temporal arrangement, he must have wanted the juxtaposition of consummation and debasement enough to be willing to put up with
the risk of absurdity: in Cinthio, Iago’s insinuations begin only
after Othello has been married for some time” (274). Snow’s
argument about Othello’s intense sexual guilt also depends
upon the assumption of consummation. He points to the
handkerchief “spotted” with red strawberries as unconsciously
evoking for Othello “the blood-stained sheets of the weddingbed and his wife’s loss of virginity there” (390).3 Greenblatt
stresses Othello’s anxieties over his own sexual pleasure as
well. He discusses how orthodox Christian doctrine at the time
held that, in the words of Saint Jerome, “‘An adulterer is he
who is too ardent a lover of his wife’” (248). As a result,
Greenblatt claims, “pleasure itself becomes for Othello pollution” (251). Stanley Cavell (1987) too believes Othello is
“horrified by human sexuality, in himself and in others” (137).
Though Cavell thinks the question of consummation is left
ambiguous, “either answer is, for Othello, intolerable: ‘Either I
shed her blood and scarred her or I did not. If I did not then
she was not a virgin and this is a stain upon me. If I did then
she is no longer a virgin and this is a stain upon me. Either way
I am contaminated’” (135).
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Traub believes there is textual evidence to suggest that
Othello is involved sexually and that this involvement only
exacerbates his emotional instability. She points to the lines in
which Othello says he would have been “happy if the general
camp / Pioners and all, had tasted her sweet body, / So I had
nothing known” (3.3.343–4). The ambiguous syntax, she suggests, implies that Othello too has lost his repose from having
himself “tasted her sweet body.” As a result, he is as Iago
describes him (continuing the oral metaphor), “eaten up with
passion” (39). I also find the fountain and current metaphors
in the following passage from Act 4 to be suggestive of sexual
engagement. Explaining to Desdemona why he is weeping,
Othello says that he could have endured sores and affliction, as
well as the scorn of society, “But there where I have garnered
up my heart, / Where either I must live or bear no life, / The
fountain from the which my current runs / Or else dries up—
to be discarded thence, / Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads
/ To knot and gender in” (4.2.56–61)—that, he says, he cannot
abide. The imagery here implies that it is his sexual connection with Desdemona that constitutes the deepest and most
vital source of his entire being.4
My students were fairly evenly split on the consummation
issue, with slightly more believing that Othello would be more
vulnerable if he had not yet had sex with Desdemona. “As a
man myself,” one wrote, “I know that the chase and pursuit are
when a man is always most vulnerable.”5 A female student
thought that if Othello “had not yet been with Desdemona
sexually, then that fact would just make him all the more
insecure.” Several felt that if he did not yet “possess” her
himself, the thought of others having her would be even more
intolerable. On the other hand, many believed that if he had
had sexual relations with Desdemona, his feelings about her
would have been all the more intense and volatile. As one
female student wrote, “Relationships seem to get more complicated and intense once sexual relations are involved.” Interestingly, a couple of female students thought that Desdemona’s
sexual engagement with Othello would have reduced or corrupted her in Othello’s mind: “He might think that because
she was willing to have sex with him, she would be willing to
have sex with someone else.” These students believed that
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sexual relations would render Desdemona “less ideal” and
therefore more open to suspicion. Another female student
spun that idea, however, in a different way, commenting that
sex with Desdemona would have made her “less ideal and
more real” to Othello. If she was closer and more real to him,
this student argued, he would have been more willing to trust
her. Regardless of one’s position on this question of sexual
consummation, the point is that the very ambiguity in the text
around the issue suggests anxiety. Othello is exceedingly
insecure and vulnerable from the beginning in his erotic
relationship with Desdemona, and Iago’s destructive energy
which ultimately consumes him emerges from this context. In
Mitchell’s words, it is “a reaction to and flight from dependency and its attendant anxieties.”
Even if one maintains a belief in an instinctually based
destructiveness, perhaps the most important problem psychoanalysis can help us address is the difficulty of locating and
accepting responsibility for that destructiveness within the self.
From an object relational perspective, one can ask whether
Othello ever achieves the depressive position by fully recognizing Iago’s evil as his own. This leads to another much debated
issue in the play: critics, along with my students, disagree about
whether Othello ever truly experiences a catharsis and acknowledges his own culpability. The debate dates back to T. S.
Eliot’s (1932) view of Othello as only “cheering himself up”
and “not thinking about Desdemona, only himself” (111) in
his final speech. Leavis (1937) echoed this position, arguing
that the “habit of self-approving self-dramatization is an essential element in Othello’s make-up, and remains so at the very
end” (142). Othello’s final assessment of himself as “one that
loved not wisely, but too well; / Of one not easily jealous”
(5.2.340–41) certainly gives one pause and may uncomfortably
remind us of O. J. Simpson’s self-justifying statement in relation to Nicole that he “loved her too much.” Bloom sees some
genuine pathos, despite the self-justifications and self-deception, in Othello’s final soliloquy. Kirsch too believes that
Othello’s dying recognition that Desdemona was true enables
him “genuinely to recover a sense of his former being, just as
his delusion that she was faithless had caused him to lose it”
(35). Neely, on the other hand, stresses Othello’s grandiosity
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through to the end, observing that “even while acknowledging
his unworthiness, he is taking credit for punishing himself”
(226).
I find students generally divided in terms of their sympathy for Othello as a tragic hero. Those who are most focused
on the threat of external evil in the world are usually most
sympathetic. Two female students this fall also wrote about the
vulnerability of being in love. “Othello never lost my sympathy,” one stated, “because no matter how strong a person you
are, you are most sensitive when you are involved with the
greatest love of your life. When that area is touched or
threatened, it is easy to act in ways you would never have
imagined.” Another commented, “I think everyone at some
time or another questions whether or not someone they love
has done something dishonest, only to find out it is not true.
That is why I maintain some sympathy for Othello.” Two years
ago, on the heels of 9/11, many students seemed to identify
with Othello’s helplessness in the face of Iago’s evil and
expressed sympathy. A year later, the majority of students in my
class were back to what had been the more common pre-9/11
attitude: they felt in the end mainly disgust and contempt for
this tragic hero. The following colorful response was typical:
“What a schmuck! Othello kills himself more out of hubris
than out of any remorse. It is this same pride that drives him
throughout the play. The prospect of having a strumpet for a
wife was just too much for his big-bad-war-hero ego to stand. I
do not feel any sympathy for Othello. In fact, I wish he hadn’t
died but was forced to live some horrid existence.”
Although I agree with most of my students that Othello
never fully takes responsibility and identifies Iago’s destructiveness as his own, the language and metaphors of the play do
recognize such an identification. This is evident in the erotic
associations of union in Othello’s line to Iago, “I am bound to
thee forever” (3.3.212), and in Iago’s even more chilling line
to Othello, “I am your own forever” (3.4.476). Such recognition is also apparent in the explicit echoing of Iago’s phrases
and imagery in Othello’s own language as the play progresses.
The text as a whole enacts a subjective drama that includes
multiple voices, positions, and points of view. As Neely comments, “The play develops out of the opposition of attitudes,
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viewpoints, and sexes. As in the comedies, no single character
or viewpoint prevails” (214). It is useful to think of the play in
terms of the psychic space of an individual consciousness in
which multiple versions of self and other interact and conflict.
This space is also one in which different modes or levels of
psychic functioning compete and co-exist in tension. The
paranoid-schizoid mode is apparent in the split between idealized goodness and absolute evil; in the terrors of engulfment
and disintegration, particularly in relation to women; in the
manic pursuit of vengeance; and in Othello’s seesawing at the
end between grandiosity and self-loathing.
Othello is stuck in a narcissistic modality that is, as
Mitchell says of characterological aggression, “embedded in
and sustained by an enduring sense of internal and external
danger” (1993, 163). Furthermore, Mitchell adds, “Much of
the political aggression and violence in the world today is
connected with nationalistic and ethnic identifications that are
rooted in a collective sense of endangerment and past humiliations” (163). Ruth Stein finds similar dynamics in the language of September 11 terrorist Mohammed Atta’s letter to his
fellow terrorists, written in preparation for the hijackings. She
too discovers defensive idealizations, splitting, and a murderous aggression emerging out of a massive sense of helplessness
and masculine failure. Women are once again associated with
shameful weakness, with engulfment and emasculation, and
thus are banished from the terrorists’ “hypermasculine” culture. The “shift from women to paternal homoerotic bonding,” she argues, “marks a specific regressive-transcendent
trajectory. . . . The frightful sliding downward toward the
feminine and maternal can be replaced . . . by an ecstatic
soaring upward, toward the Heavenly Father” (402–3). Atta’s
letter, Stein observes, does not speak about hatred but “absurdly and perversely, it is about love”—love of God, the father:
“‘everywhere you go say that prayer and smile and be calm, for
God is with the believers. And the angels protect you without
you feeling anything. . . . You should feel complete tranquility,
because the time between you and your marriage . . . is very
short’” (398). The terrorists’ plans of mass murder, Stein
concludes, contain a fantasy of magical solution to one’s inner
terrors: “Killing the subversive, disturbing part of oneself that
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has been projected outward, will, it is hoped, silence once and
for all the confused tumult and bad feelings about the self”
(412).
As Shakespeare’s Othello immerses us in some analogous
patterns, it indeed proves particularly timely and relevant. Yet
the play also presents us with alternatives, with other levels of
psychic functioning, and other versions of self. The text, for
instance, includes a character like the unidealized, pragmatic
Emilia (Iago’s wife), who combines a basic goodness with a
flawed or imperfect humanity, a character who could not exist
in a purely paranoid-schizoid universe. And as mentioned,
although Othello may not recognize it, the play as a whole
acknowledges the depressive reality that Iago does indeed
belong to Othello—“I am your own forever.” Or perhaps more
precisely, Iago’s demonic destructiveness belongs to Othello
just as Othello’s narcissistic rage over betrayal and abandonment belongs to Iago—they’re of a piece, along with the
idealized/denigrated woman. Adelman also believes that the
play is not wholly immersed in its primitive maternal/sexual
fantasies. Although she argues that Othello, like Troilus and
Cressida, enacts a “morning-after fantasy in which the madonna
is transformed into the whore,” unlike Troilus, Othello locates
that fantasy “not in the unstable female body but in the
diseased male imagination” (64). Adelman senses an attempt
at dissociation from the pathological male fantasy:
“Shakespeare’s portrayal of the love-death, like his portrayal of
Desdemona throughout, marks his attempt to dissociate himself from this fantasy” (73).
Finally, the fact that at the end of the play Iago does not
die but is only silenced suggests a recognition that the regressive, destructive response is forever a potential threat in
human life and relations. We must be particularly vigilant in
times when external circumstances, like the terrorist acts,
evoke anxiety and insecurity and can provoke collective narcissistic defenses. If we understand the malignity that Iago
represents—the aggressive envy that attacks the good because
it is good—as more responsive than instinctual, then our
attention is directed to the social conditions that ignite and
sustain such regressive fury.
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The very debates that Othello inspires may, in the end, be a
reflection of the conflicting positions or self-states operating
within the drama itself. In discussing the play, the classroom
too becomes a space for holding in tension, for tolerating
diverse feelings and opposing points of view. As it holds and
contains conflict and difference, the classroom in fact works
against destructive, narcissistic defenses and itself models a
vital goal of psychic development.
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Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Besides the Oliver Parker-directed film version of Othello in 1995, two updated
screen adaptations appeared in 2001: the film O, set in a private high school,
directed by Tim Blake Nelson, and a British ITV production, set in an urban
police force, directed by Geoffrey Sax.
See, for instance, Novy (1984, 129), Kirsch (1981, 25–26), and Wheeler (1985,
202). Greenblatt (1980) also notes the tempestuous imagery and the references
to death in the Cyprus reunion scene. He believes these associations reflect
Othello’s ambivalence about desire because his “erotic intensity” conflicts with
“Christian orthodoxy” (242).
See Rudnytsky (1985) for a wide-ranging psychoanalysis of the handkerchief as
a symbol of all the “displacements of affect” (185) in the play. Rudnytsky
examines the handkerchief as a “floating signifier” (171), a symbol for what is
missing or absent, including unconscious fantasies of the primal scene, merger
with the mother, castration anxiety, and oedipal conflict.
Several critics have also noted, in Adelman’s (1992) words, the “maternal
valence” (274) of this passage. See, for instance, Snow (1980, 404) and Novy
(1984, 132). Kirsch (1981) finds in the imagery here a “conflation of images of
the breast and of the womb,” and he believes it suggests “the tragic vulnerability
of a love so absolutely rooted in, and dependent upon, the exaltation of
symbiotic union” (33).
As there were only five male students in this class of twenty-four, I found it
difficult to make any generalizations about the responses along gender lines.
The five males, in fact, differed quite substantially from one another in their
individual responses. Nevertheless, I do think gender plays a role in these
students’ responses, and thus I have indicated the gender of the respondent
when it seemed relevant.
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